Abstract. Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography. Crépeau showed the first quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer in 1994 based on the transmission of polarized light and the exist of the secure quantum bit commitment protocol. The protocol he constructed satisfy both the correctness and the privacy for Alice with probability 1 − ε n , the privacy for Bob with probability 1 2 . In this paper, we show that quantum can be constructed using only the Bell states, and the scheme satisfies the correctness and the privacy for Alice with probability 1, the privacy for Bob with probability . Finally, We show that quantum bit commitment and quantum coin flipping can be constructed using QOT.
Introduction

Background
Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Quantum cryptography currently has only two aspects, both mostly theoretical. The first is quantum key exchange [6, 7] , the second is the effect of quantum computing on cryptanalysis [19] .
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography.
OT was first put forward by Rabin [18] . In 1985, Even, Goldreich and Lempel provided another similar cryptographic tool named 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [9] using any public key cryptosystem. In 1989, Bellare and Micali show how to implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer without interaction [16] , through the medium of a public file.
Informally speaking in an oblivious Transfer, Alice sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time (this fact is out of their control), Alice does not find out what happened, Bob knows if he got the bit or nothing. Similarly, in a one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, Alice has two bits b 0 , b 1 that she sends to Bob in such a way that he can decide to get either of them at his choosing but not both. Alice never finds out which bit Bob received.
There are two kinds of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, one is named bit oblivious transfer, and the other is named string oblivious transfer, i.e. the difference between the two OTs is that Alice sends two bits or two strings to Bob. In 2000, Stefan Wolf showed that 1-out-of-2 string oblivious can be reduced to 1-out-of-2 bit oblivious transfer [20] .
A more general oblivious transfer is 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. In the scheme, Bob can get only one from the n messages sent from Alice. In 1996, Brassard, Crepeau and Santha showed that 1-out-of-n oblivious transfers could be constructed by intersecting codes [10] . In 1999, Naor and Pinkas provided a 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer with adaptive queries [13] .
m-out-of-n (1 ≤ m < n) oblivious transfer is the most general one. m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed by 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer m time [13] . However, it can be constructed more efficiently. In, 2002, Mu, Zhang, and Varadharajan showed that m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed based on discrete logarithm [22] .
In 1994, Claude Crépeau provided a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [5] (QOT) based on the transmission of polarized light and the exist of secure quantum bit commitment protocol [3] . He proved that if both of the two parties follow the protocol, then Bob can get the one and only one bit except with a negligeable number ε n . However, Mayor showed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible [12] .
Results and Organization
In this paper, we construct a quantum 1-out-of-2 bit oblivious transfer (Bit-QOT 1 2 ) based only on the Bell States. Bob can get one and only one bit with probability 1. Alice can only decides which bit Bob with probability 1 2 . Furthermore, we construct quantum 1-out-of-2 string oblivious transfer (String-QOT 1 2 ), quantum 1-out-of-n string oblivious transfer (String-QOT 1 n ), quantum m-out-of-n string oblivious transfer (String-QOT m n , 1 ≤ m < n) based on the Bit-QOT 1 2 , so we have the corollary that String-QOT m n and Bit-QOT m n can be constructed using Bit-QOT 1 2 . In section 2, we give the definitions of the QOTs. In section 3, we construct a 1-out-of-2 QOT based on the Bell states and proof that is satisfy the definition. In section 4, We show the relation between the QOTs, which implies that QOT m n can be constructed using only QOT 1 2 . Finilly, we provide some further works related to QOT.
Definition
In this section, we formally describe the definitions of QOTs. Let B 1 be the information that Alice can get from Bob, A 2 be the information that Bob can get from Alice. A 1 be the output of Alice in the scheme, B 2 be the output of Bob in the scheme. Definition 2.1 (Quantum 1-out-of-2 Oblivious-Transfer (QOT 1 2 ) ):Bob has a bit c ∈ {0, 1}, m 0 , m 1 are the two messages that Alice wants to send to Bob. We say that QOT 1 2 is a 1-outof-2 oblivious transfer if
In the definition, the first point means that
i.e. Alice cannot decide which message Bob can get from the two messages m 0 , m 1 . The second point means that Bob can get only one message from the two messages but not both.
Definition 2.2 (Quantum m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer (QOT
wants to send to B. We say that QOT m n is m-out-of-n oblivious-transfer if
In the definition, the first point means that Alice cannot decide which m messages Bob can get. The second point means that Bob can get only m messages from the n messages sent from Alice.
3 Bit-QOT 
Based on Bell States
In this section, we present a Bit-QOT 1 2 scheme based on the Bell states.
Intuition of the Bit-QOT
2
The Bit-QOT 1 2 makes use of some interesting properties of the Bell states and it could be easier to implement in the lab. It relies on the Bell states:
and the four Pauli matrices
If the Bob wants to know b 1 , he builds the following 3-qubit state
and if he wants to know b 2 he builds
Bob keeps the first qubit to himself, sends the second qubit and the third qubit to Alice. It is easy to see that Alice always gets a completely mixed qubit, so she learns nothing about c(c = 1 or c = 2). When Alice gets the qubits, she applies σ b 1 b 2 ⊗ σ b 1 b 2 to the second and the third qubits. It is easy to verify:
That is, Alice will applies a phase flip if b 1 = 1 and a bit flip if b 2 = 1. So if Bob wants to know b 1 , the qubits become
and if Bob wants to know b 2 , the qubits become
Alice measures the third qubit and announces the result to Bob. So 1. If c = 1 and the result be |0 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
2. if c = 1 and the result be |1 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
3. If c = 2 and the result be |0 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
4. if c = 2 and the result be |1 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
From the four cases, we find that if c=2, the remanent qubits is pure states, while if c=1, the remanent qubits is entanglement state. If Alice measures the second qubit, the remanent qubit would be |0 or |1 , Bob cannot get any information from the remanent qubit. To avoid this,
Alice applies the Hadamard transform to the second qubit , which map
After the transformation, the first and the second qubits become |ϕ 4 . Finally, Alice measures the second qubit and announces the result to Bob, which leave one qubit |ϕ 5 . After measurement the second qubit, Bob get the first qubit without any entanglemant, He applies the Hadamard transformation to the first qubit and gets |ϕ 6 , which maps
Bob measures the first qubit and get |b c with probability 1 according to the table 1 and table 2. 3.2 Bit-QOT
We present the Bit-QOT 1 2 in the following. (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 10 ) 
Analysis
Correctness : If Bob follows the scheme, he will get b c he wanted.
Privacy : As Alice always gets completely mixed qubits, so she learn nothing about c. |ϕ 2 = |0 (a 00 |B 00 + (−1)
After the measurement of the second qubit and the third qubit, Bob has a qubit likes
whice satisfies
Suppose that Bob can work out xb 1 + yb 2 , however, he can not figure out both b 1 and b 2 using only xb 1 + yb 2 . We have the conclusion that Bob can get only one of b 1 and b 2 .
Relations between the QOTs
In this section, we will show the relations between the QOTs, we will use the Bit-QOT 1 2 as a sub protocol, construct other QOTs, the relations between them are showed in the following figure: The messages in the QOT scheme can be bits or strings. In this section we show that String-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using an Bit-QOT 1 2 as sub protocol, and vice versa.
4.1.1
Construct String-QOT 1 2 using Bit-QOT 1 2
In the String-QOT 1 2 , Bob has input c, Alice has input strings s 0 and s 1 , each of them consist of k bits:
For any i(1 ≤ i ≤ k), Alice and Bob run the Bit-QOT 1 2 with the input b 0i , b 1i and c. So
and
Bob links the output of Bit-QOT 1 2 s together to be the output of the String-QOT 1 2 s. The following protocol is the String-QOT 1 2 .
Protocol 4.1 String-QOT 1 2 (s 0 , s 1 )(c)
String-QOT-output=Null String;
For i=1 to k
• Bob and Alice excute Bit-QOT 1 2 (b 0i , b 1i )(c);
•
String-QOT-output=String-QOT-output+Bit-QOT-output;
3. Bob output String-QOT-output;
Halt.
The probability in the String-QOT 1 2 we construct is
So, String-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using Bit-QOT 1 2 .
Construct Bit-QOT 1 2 using String-QOT 1 2
In the Bit-QOT 1 2 , Alice has input bits b 0 and b 1 , Bob has input c. Alice construct two strings
Alice and Bob run the protocol String-QOT 1 2 (s 0 , s 1 )(c) with the probability satisfying
Bob gets the output of the String-QOT 
The Bit-QOT 1 2 scheme is in the following: 
Halt
The probability of the Bit-QOT we construct is
So Bit-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using String-QOT 1 2 . In 1999, Naor and Pinkas showed that 1-out-of-n QOT can be constructed using 1-out-of-2
Relation between the String-QOT
QOT based on the pseudo-random function [14] . We will show that 1-out-of-n QOT can be constructed solely by 1-out-of-2 QOT.
Construct String-QOT
We first construct String-QOT 1 n using String-QOT 1 2 , Alice have n messages M = {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n }. Bob has choice c. We construct a String-QOT 1 n scheme in the following
1. Alice constructs n random strings r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ;
2. Bob select c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c n ∈ {1, 2} decided by c;
Alice and Bob run
String-QOT 1 2 (r 1 , m 1 )(c 1 ), String-QOT 1 2 (r 1 , m 2 ⊕ r 1 )(c 2 ), String-QOT 1 2 (r 2 , m 3 ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 )(c 3 ), · · · String-QOT 1 2 (r n−1 , m n−1 ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r n−2 )(c n−1 ), String-QOT 1 2 (r n , m n ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r n−1 )(c n ); 4. Bob get m c = (m c ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r c−1 ) ⊕ (r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r c−1 );
Halt.
From the scheme we constructed, we find that if Bob want to get m c , he has to get m c ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r c−1 and r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r c−1 , by the property of the QOT 1 2 , he cannot get r c and m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m c−1 . As he cannot get r c , he cannot get m c+1 , m c+2 , · · · , m n . It is easy to check that
Run the String-QOT 1 n ) m times, we get an String-QOT m n scheme.
1. Alice and Bob run
2. Halt.
From the above constructing, we can check
So QOT m n can be constructed using QOT 1 2 . 
Construct String-QOT
Halt.
So, we have the following probability 
Application
Bit Commitment
In bit commitment, Bob enters a bit b. At a later time, Aliceamy request this bit and, whenever he does, he receives this bit, otherwise he learns nothing about b. In 1993, Brassard, etc presented a quantum bit commitment [3] based on the BB84. In 1995, Mayers showed that this kind of bit commitment is impossible [12] . It doesn't mean that any quantum bit commitment is impossible. We show that secure quantum bit commitment can be achieve using the quantum oblivious transfer we constructe in the above. We give a Quantum bit commitment scheme in the following, it consistes of two sub protocols, Commit( ) and U nveil( ): 
Coins Tossing
In many cryptographic protocols, there is a need for random bits that are common to both parties. However, if one of parties is allowed to generate these random bits, this party may have a chance to finfluence the outcome of the protocol by appropriately picking the random bits [11] .
In the case of quantum, people try to find more secure scheme [6, 17, 23, 1] . In 2001, Ambainis constructed a quantum coin flipping protocol [1] . In this part, we construct a quantum coin flpping using the QOT. If Alice and Bob follow the scheme, they can get c satisfying the condition P rob(c = 0) = P rob(c = 1) = 1 2
It is obvious that Alice and Bob would not cooperate. We suppose that one of the two parties,
Bob wants to cheat in the scheme. He can not decide which bit Alice chooses,as he cannot get both b A 0 , b A 1 .
Conclusion and Further works
The construction in this paper shows the potential of quantum cryptography. The oblivious transfer we constructed can be realized using the quantum communication and some simple quantum operation. In the end, two of the following points may be instresting for further works:
1. The physical realization of the QOT schemes.
2. The relation between the QOT and the other quantum cryptography scheme besides coins tossing, bit commitment.
